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The wanton and malicious use of the steam whistle of a
locomotive .by servants of a railroad company who are in
charge of the locomotive, while it is in motion on a regular or

authorized run, is an act within the scope of their employment
so far as to charge the company with liability for injuries

caused thereby.

LOCKE, District Judge, dissenting.

The plaintiff, while riding on horseback along a public road running
parallel with the railway of the defendant company, received serious personal injuries as a result of the fright of his horse, which was caused by
the malicious blowing of a whistle by one of the defendant's servants in
charge of a locomotive on the railway. The defendant sought to defend
the action on the ground that a master is not responsible for a wanton,
wilful, and malicious act, not done on the master's account or to further
his interest, but committed exclusively for the servant's private ends, or
maliciously. Held, that the company was chargeable with the results of
the servant's act.
MCCORMICK, Circuit Judge .-

We are in danger of refining

too much when we attempt to distinguish between a negligent
and a wanton or malicious use of the steam whistle of a locomotive engine in charge of the proper servants of the company
while engaged in pulling its regular trains, moving at schedule
rate or schedule time, under direct, constant, telegraphic orders.
If it is contended that, in this act, the servants were not in the
master's service, because not employed to blow the whistle.
I Reported in 62 Fed. Rep. 73o.

OR MALICIOUS ACTS OF SERVANTS.

-wantonly and maliciously to frighten travelers or their horses,
that contention is fully answered by the Supreme Court of
Illinois,-that these servants are not employed to do any
negligent or unlawful act, and such a test would exempt the
company from liability from all affirmative acts of these servants violating the rights of others: Railway Co. v. Harmon,
47 1Il. 298; Railroad Co. v. Dickson, 63 Ill. 151. "It is conceded that, in case of passengers receiving injury from the
action of the servants of the railroad company, no distinction
between negligent and wanton and malicious conduct obtains.
It is contended that, in such cases, the corporation is held
because of its contract to carry safely. That is one reason,
and a cogent one, for holding the company in such cases;
but it is only one of the grounds for so holding. If public
policy and safety require that carriers who undertake to convey
persons by the powerful, but dangerous, agency of steam, shall
be held to the greatest possible care and diligence, and,
whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of the passengers
should not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of
carriers' agents, or their wanton malice, the same public policy
and safety demand that these all-pervading corporations, who
commit to the custody and use of their servants, in such great
numbers, these terrible expressions of the powerful and dangerous agency of steam, shall maintain discipline in their
ranks, and by the utmost care and diligence protect the public,
not only from its negligent use, but from its wanton or malicious use, by these servants, to the hurt of any one in the
lawful enjoyment of the state's peace. To say that the engineer and fireman who have charge of the locomotive on a
regular run may, while so running it, so blow the whistle,
wantonly and maliciously, that by their manner of blowing it
and motive for blowing it, in the indulgence of their love of
mischief or other evil motive, they separate themselves, in and
by that act and for that instant, from the company's service, is
to refine beyond the line of safety and sound reason. Public
policy and public safety require that the use of the steam
whistle by those servants who are in charge of the locomotive,
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and while the locomotive is in motion on its regular or authorized runs, should be held to be done within the scope of the
employment of these servants, so far as to charge the company with liability therefor.
LIABILITY OF A MASTER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO THIRD'

PARTIES CAUSED BY THE WILFUL OR MALICIOUS ACTS OF
HIS SERVANTS.

That a master is liable in damages to a third person who
receives an injury from an act of a servant, which is authorized
by the master, or fairly implied from the nature of the servant's employment, and the duties which are annexed, and
incident to it, is a pi oposition of law which is well established
and universally followed. The difficulty which has given rise
to the great number of cases in all jurisdictions, has been in
applying the proposition to the actual facts. Every class of
employment and service presents a new set of conditions, and
while it may be true that the master is liable to a third party
for an injury caused by an act of the servant, committed by
him while acting within the scope, and during the course of the
employment, yet the very terms being variables, the line of
demarcation is often hard to draw. The acts of servants
which result in injuries to third persons, are divisible into two,
general classes, acts of omission, and acts of commission.
As to the former, it has been long the rule that the master is
liable for injuries caused thereby, and the question in each
case simply reduces itself to a consideration whether the act
was in reality within or without the scope of the particular

employment. Originally the courts held, that for wilful acts,
or acts of commission, the rule was different, and assigned as
a reason for this, that by the very act of wilfulness, the servant, ipso facto, left the employment and became an independent tort feasor. The case usually cited to substantiate

this argument is McManus v. Cricket, I East. Io6. This was
an action of trespass, in which the declaration charged that the
defendant, with force and arms, drove a certain chariot against
a chaise, in which the plaintiff was riding, by which the plaintiff was thrown out and injured. It appeared that the servant.
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of the defendant wilfully drove the chariot into the plaintiff,.
but that the defendant himself was not present, nor did he in
any way, either expressly or impliedly, authorize or assent to
the act, and on these facts, Lord Kenyon said: "It is a question of very general concern, and has been often canvassed,
but I hope at last it will be at rest. . . . Now, when a servant quits sight of the object for which he is employed, and
without having in view his master's orders, pursues that which
his own malice suggests, he no longer acts in pursuance of
the authority given him, and his master will not be answerable
for such act." The controlling element in the case is the
absence of any authority, either express or implied, on the
part of the servant, to do the act complained of; and while it
is suggested by Lord Kenyon, that the act of the servant
being a trespass, the master could not be held liable under
such circumstances, nevertheless, the case merely decided that
the master is not liable for a wilful wrong committed by his
servant where there is a total absence of authority in the
servant to do the act.
The early cases, both in England and America, which
maintain or suggest the distinction of liability between negligent and wilful acts, are collected in Wight v. Wilcox, 19
Wend. 342. This was an action brought for an injury sustained by the son of the plaintiff in being run over by a wagon
driven by S. Wilcox, the son of J. Wilcox, while in the
employment of the father. The plaintiff's son was on his way
to school, and asked S. Wilcox to permit him to ride, who
answered that he might do so when he got up a hill which he
was then ascending. When the hill was ascended, the lad
took hold of the side of the wagon between the front and
hind wheels.
S. Wilcox did not stop his team, although
cautioned by a bystander to do so, but looking back and seeing the plaintiff's son attempting to get on the wagon, he
cracked his whip and put the horses upon a trot. The plaintiff's son fell, and the wheel passed over him. The plaintiff
recovered in the court below, but on a motion for a new trial,
Cowen J., reversing the decision, said: ". . . It is different
with a wilful act of mischief. To subject the master in such
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a case, it must be proved that he actually assented, for the law
will not imply assent. .

.

.

The law holds such a wilful act

a departure from the master's business."
In Pin),ear v. Thompson, 5 Hump. (Tenn.), 396, the court
carried the distinction between wilful and negligent acts to an
extreme position. The plaintiff sought to recover the value of
a negro boy who was killed by the overseer of the defendant
while inflicting punishment for an offence.
Puryear had
instructed the overseer to "give the negro a good whippingbe sure and humble him before you let him down." The
overseer whipped the negro severely, and as a result of the
chastisement the latter -died. The court held that if the overseer, in pursuance of the defendant's directions, intended only
to chastise the negro until he should be humbled, and in the
attainment of that object, so negligently and recklessly inflicted
blows as to take the life of the negro, the defendant would be
liable. But if he abandoned the purpose to chastise until the
negro should be humbled, and employed instruments of
torture to justify his malice, intending to. kill the negro, in
such case the defendant would not be, liable.
Such an argument, however, is fallacious, and illustrates the
fact that the confusion which has arisen with regard to wilful acts
of servants, is due to a misapprehension. It may be true that,
from the standpoint of the wrong-doer, the servant, the act
was wilfully done, but from the standpoint of the master, the
result is still an accident--one which the master may be liable
for, because had he not employed the servant to achieve the
result contemplated, the servant would not have desired to
have accomplished the end, in the furtherance of which
a wilful tort has been committed. "If the act is properly
chargeable to the master, that is, if it can be fairly said to be
his act and not the act of the servant, the motives, purpose or
intention of the servant, cannot operate to shield the master
from the consequences. If it was an act done in doing that
which the master employed the servant to do, although done
contrary to the master's will, against his instructions and
without his knowledge, although unnecessary to accomplish
the work, ill-advised, malicious, or wanton, he is liable, because
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he has set in motion the agency which produces the wrong:"
Wood, 'zster and Servant, § 303.
The case of Wrigiht v. Wilcox, supra, has been generally
discarded: Weed v. Panama R. R., 17 N. Y. 362; MWali v.
Lord, 39 N. Y. 384; Isaacs v. R. R., 47 N. Y. 122; Rounds
v. R. R., 64 N. Y. 129, and cases subsequently cited.
In Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & A. 590, the court of King's
Bench say that "the distinction is this; If a servant, driving a
carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly
strike the horses of another person and produce an accident,
the master will not be liable. But, if, in order to perform his
master's orders, he strikes, but injudiciously, and in order to
extricate himself from a difficulty, that will be negligent and
careless conduct, for which the master will be liable, being an
act done in pursuance of the servant's employment." The
case showed that the defendant's servant had wilfully struck
the plaintiff's horses, when driving his master's carriage, in
order to extricate himself from an entanglement of the carriage caused by his own fault, and thereby had caused an
injury to the plaintiff; and a verdict for the plaintiff was sup
ported. In Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 H. & N. 359, Chief
Barcn Pollock asks the question: "Suppose a servant, driving
along a road in order to avoid a danger, intentionally drove
into the carriage of another, would not the master be liable?"
and in Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., i H. & C.
526, it was decided in the Exchequer Chamber that the master
is responsible if the servant is in the course of doing the
master's work, and does the act to accomplish it.
In Rlowe v. New March, 12 Allen 49, Hoar, J., states the
true rule of liability to be this: "The master is not responsible as a trespasser, unless by direct or implied authority to
the servant he consents to the wrongful act. But, if the
master gives an order to a servant which implies the use of
force and violence to others, leaving to the direction of the
servant to decide when the occasion arises to which the order
applies, and the extent and kind of force to be used, he is
liable if the servant in executing the order makes use of force
in a manner or to a degree, which is unjustifiable. . . . If the
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act be done in the execution of the authority given him by
the master and for the purpose of performing what the master
has directed, the master will be responsible whether the
wrong done be occasioned by negligence or by a reckless or
wanton purpose to ccomplish the master's business in an
unlawful manner." Cf., also, Ramsdcn v. R. R. Co., lO4
Mass. I17; Wallace v. Express Co., 134 Mass. 95.
In Eckert v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 2 Mo. App. 36, Bakewell, J., said: " The question, in cases of this kind, is not
whether the act of the servant is wilful or negligent. . . . The
inquiry is, whether the act was done in the course of the servant's employment. The argument that when the servant
acts wilfully he, ipso facto, leaves the employment of the master
for the minute or so that this passion rages, is rightly characterized as a specious fallacy. . . . The master, in case of negligence
or wilfulness, is liable, not so much for having impliedly
authorized the act, as for having employed a faithless servant
who did the injury in the course of his employment. Cf., also,
Priesterv. Augley, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 44 ; Railroad v. Derby,
.14 How. (U. S.) 468.
It is in accordance with the proposition as laid down in this
case that the majority of the cases have been decided; and it
may be safely said that, while a different opinion does, to
some slight degree, exist, yet the tendency certainly is to
blend all the acts of servants which result in injuries to third
persons under one head. Cf. Fick v. Chicago, etc., R. R.. 68 Wis.
469; 1M4ort v. Ice Co.. 73 N. Y. 543; Rounds v. R. R., 64 N. Y.
129; Marion v. R. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 429; Grcat Western Ry.
v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 ; Dickson v. Waldron, 35 N. E. I.
The question whether a wilful act is or is not within the
scope of the servant's employment is, obviously, one which
must depend upon the facts of each separate case which arises.
As, however, the decision in the leading case suggests a consideration of the subject, it might be advantageous to group
the cases in a more or less systematic manner, giving the facts
of the more important cases, and referring to those consistent
or inconsistent with them. It will be seen that the authorities
are irreconcilible.
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ACTS OF SERVANTS

EMPLOYED ON STEAM

RAILROADS.

Acts of Agents.
In Fick v. Chicago R. R., 68 Wis. 469, a ticket agent left
another employ6 in charge of the ticket office of the defendant
company, who failed to return to the plaintiff the proper
change upon the sale of a ticket; and after being asked therefor by the purchaser, assaulted and struck the latter. The
company was held liable in damages. Cf., also, McKearnan v.
R. R., 22 J. & S. (N. Y.) 354 ; Christian v. Columbus & Rome
R.R., 59 Ga. 46o.
In Mdulligan v. Xe, York, etc., R. R., 29 N. E. 952, the
defendant's ticket agent, acting under a notice given him by
police officials to look out for a counterfeit $5 bill, and
describing three men as passing the same, supposing a bill
presented by the plaintiff to be a counterfeit, and the plaintiff,
one of the persons described, ordered his arrest after accepting
the bill in payment for a ticket. It -was held .that the company could not be held liable for the arrest, which proved to
be false, since, if, in fact, the servant was acting within the
scope of his duty, he would have refused the money for the
property of his principal and would have refused to part with
such property except upon receipt of what, at least, he believed
to be good money.
Acts of Baggagemen.
In Little Mami P. P. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio, ioo, it appeared
that the plaintiff after purchasing a ticket as a passenger,
applied to the servant of the defendant company, charged
with the duty of checking baggage, to have baggage checked,
and by his abusive language towards the servant, provoked a.
quarrel, in which the servant, to gratify his personal resentment, struck the plaintiff with a hatchet. It was decided that
the act was outside of the servants' employment..
In Rounds v. R. R., 64. N. Y. 129,. the plaintiff, havihggotten upon the platform of a baggage car of the defendants"
road, was ordered to get off, as the rules of the company forbade all persons, except certain employ~s, to, ride on the baggage cars. The plaintiff, hesitating to jump off while the car
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was in motion, was kicked off by the servant in charge, and
fell under the cars. The company was held liable. Cf., however, Louisville, etc., R. R., v. Douglass, I I So. 933.
Acts of Brakemen.
In Moody v. Texas; etc., R. R. Co., 23 S. W. 41, it was held,
that the defendant company was not liable for the wilful act
of a brakeman in kicking a trespasser from its moving train,
whereby the trespasser was killed. Cf., also, Alabama R. R.
v. Harris, 14 So. 263; Tow'anda Coal Co. v. Herman, 86 Pa.
418; Faber v. Mtlissouri, etc., R. R., 32 Mo. App. 378;
Marion v. R. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 429; R. R. Co. v. Hendricks,
48 Ark. 177; and Cf., Texas R. R. v. Mather, 24 S. W. 79;
Cain v. elfinn. R. R., 39 Minn. 297. The plaintiff, a boy of 13,
-either attempted to board, or succeeded in boarding, a train
moving over the defendant's railway. It appeared he had
hold of the car-rail, with one foot on the step, and the other
just leaving the ground, when the brakeman kicked him in
the chest, breaking his hold upon the rail, whereby he fell,
and the car passed over his leg. The company was held
liable; Molloy v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. R., Io Daly, 453;
Heffel v. St. Paul R. R., 49 Minn. 263; Kelly v. Kansas City
R. R., 3 6 Kan. 655; Smith v. R. R. Co., 23 S. W. 652;
Lucas v. R. R., 56 N. W. 1039; Lang v. R. R., 4 N. Y. S. 565.
Acts of Conductors.
In Ramsden v. Boston, etc., R. R., 104 Mass. 117, the plaintiff,
a female, got into the defendant's cars, and paid the fare to the
conductor, who later attempted to again collect the same, and
upon a refusal to pay, committed an assault upon the plaintiff.
The plaintiff recovered. Cf., also, Paddock v. R. R., 37 Fed.
841; Coleman v. R. R., lo6 Mass. 1871 ; R. R. Co. v.
Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike Co.,
46 N. Y. 23: Wabash R. R. v. Rector, 104 Ill. 296; Jeffersonville R. R. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116; Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. v. Blocket, 27 Md. 277; I-Iagen v. R. R. Co., 3 R. I.
88; Moore v. R. R., 4 Gray, 465; Winnegar's Adn. v. R. R.,
85 Ky. 547; Chicago R. R. v. Flexmnan, 103 Ill. 546; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. 365; Smith v. R. R.,
24 N. E. 753.
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The plaintiff got upon a freight car, and after it had started
the condactor told him to get off The plaintiff then offered to
pay fare, but the conductor declined to take it, and gave the
plaintiff a push, so that he had to jump to save himself and
thereby incurred injuries. It appeared that the company had
instructed its conductors that they should not allow any
person to ride on any freight car. The court held thedefendant company liable: Hohnes v. Wakefield, 12 Allen, 58o.
A conductor on the defendant's road finding that the carhad been robbed, and suspecting the plaintiff's son to have
committed the crime, walked up to him and killed him. Itwas held that the act was beyond the servant's employment,.
and that he alone was responsible in damages: Cardiff v. R. R.,
7 So. 6oi.
Acts of Engineers.
A railroad company was held liable in Chicago R. R. v.
Dickson, 63 111. 15 i, for maliciously blowing a whistle whereby
the horse of the plaintiff became unmanageable and the plaintiff was injured: Cf., also, R. R. Co. v. Starrns,9 Heisk. 52. And
in R. R. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298, for maliciously allowing
steam to escape, and thereby frightening the plaintiff's team of
horses to his personal damage. For wilfully backing art
engine towards a street car, whereby the plaintiff thinking a
collision imminent, jumped out and was injured, the court held,
in Stephenson v. Southern Pacific R. R., 93 Cal. 558, that the
plaintiff could not properly charge the company. Cf., also, in
general: Gulf, C. & S. C. R. Co. v. XAirkbride, 15 S. W.
495 ; M1ars v. Canal Co., 8 N. Y. S.107 ; Fitzsimmons v. R. R.,
57 N. W. 127; Carter v. Louisville R. R., 98 Ind. 552.
Acts of Firemen.
In Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. R. v. Epperson, 26
E. B. Smith (Ill. App.), 72, a fireman on the defendant's
road, from mere wantonness, placed torpedoes under the cars
and caused an injury to the plaintiff The court held that the
act was outside of the scope of the fireman's employment, and
the company was not liable for his act: Cf., in general,
Flower v. PentsylvaniaR. R., 49 Pa. 2 10.
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Acts of Porters.
For assault of passenger by porter the company was held
liable in Dwinelle v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 24 N. E. 319;
Cf., also, W1Villiams v. Pullman Car Co., 33 American & English
R. R. Cases, 414. For ejecting a passenger from a moving
train, whereby the former was killed, the company was held liable
in Harlinger v. N. Y C., etc., R. R., 15 Weekly Digest
(N. Y.), 392. Cf., also, Thorp v. N. Y. C. R. R., 76 N. Y.
402.

Acts of Watchmen.
Company held liable for act of a bridge watchman, who
shot a trespasser on the bridge he was guarding: fHaeld v.
Wabash R. Co., 24 S. W. 737.
Acts of Other Servants of Railroad Company.
In Hewitt v. Swift, 3 Allen 420, the evidence showed that
one F was a servant of the company having charge of the
freight in the depot at Charleston, and the plaintiff, a small
boy, was playing there, and refused to leave; F thereupon removed him forcibly, and, in doing so, kicked him severely.
The company was held liable. A company was held liable, in
Terre Haute, etc., Co. v. Jackson, 8i Ind. 19, for wilfully
drenching the plaintiff with water. Cf. for other illustrations
of wilful acts in this connection: Harriman v. R. R. Co., 45
Ohio, I I; Il. Cent. R. R. v. Ross, 31 111. App. 170;
Northwestern R. R. Co. v. Hack, 66 Il 328; Nevin v.Pullman
Car-Co., 106 Ill. 222; Denver R. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S.
597 ; Wabash R. R. v. Rector, 104 Ill. 296.
STREET

RAILWAY COmPANIES.

Acts of Conductors.
In an action against a street railroad company for ejecting
a passenger with unnecessary force, while the car was in
motion, the company was held liable: Chicago, etc., R. R. v.
Pelletier,24 N. E. 770; Pine v. St. Paul,etc., R. R., 52 N. W.
392; New York, etc., R. R. v. Haring, 47 N. J. L. 137;
Sandfordv. R. R., 23 N. Y. 343 ; Mkurphy v. RR., II8 Mass.
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228 ; Mceon v. R. R., 42 Mo. 80; Putman v. R. R., 55 N.Y.
i o8 ; PassengerR.R. Co. v. Young, 21 Ohio, 518; Harman v.
-. R. Co., 52 N. W. 830; Savanalk, cc., R. R. v. Bryan, 12
S. E. 307; Macken v. People's R. R., 45 Mo. App. 82; Stea
v. 6th Ave. R. R., 62 N. Y. iSo; Klinev. Central R. R., 37
Cal. 4oo; Schaultz v. R. R., 89 N. Y. 242; c., however,
Jsaacs v.3rd Ave. R. R., 47 N. Y. 122, where it appeared that
the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's car, desiring to
alight, passed out upon the platform and requested the conductor to stop the car and refused to get out until the car
came to a full stop, whereupon the conductor threw her with
force from the car, and she incurred injury. It was held that
the act was not chargeable to the company. Cf., also, Citizens
R. R. v. Willoeby, 33 N. E. 627; Drew v. 6th Ave. R. R., 26
N. Y. 49 ; Hart v. R. R., 57 N. W. 91.
Acts of Drivers.
A passenger on a street car, to whom the driver had used
profane language, replied that he would report the driver to
the company at the office, which was at the stables of the company, where the car stopped for change of horses. Before
reaching there the passenger got off the car, intending to go to
the office, and the driver followed and assaulted him. It was
held that the act of the driver was beyond the scope of
his authority: Central R. R. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 259. Cf.,
also, Chicago R. R. v. Mogk., 44 Ill. App. 17; Ryan v. R. R.
Co., i J. & S. (N. Y.) 137 ; R. R. Co. v. Donahoe, 70 Pa. 119.

Cf., however, Wilton v. Middlesex R. R., 107 Mass. io8;
Lovettv. SalemR. R., 9 Allen, 557; Kline v. R. R., 37 Cal. 400;
Hogan v. Ry. Co., 124 N. Y. 647 ; Hestonville R. R. v. Biddle,
112 Pa. 551.
Where a driver wilfully had a passenger arrested the company was held liable: Lafayette v. Rwy. Co., 8 So. 701, and
cf. similarly: Winneger's Admx. v. R. R., 85 Ky. 547.
So, also, the company employing a driver who purposely
ran into a plaintiff while driving a carriage, has been held
liable on the ground that the act was one within the line of
employment: Cohen v. Dry Dock R. R., 69 N. Y. 170.
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COMPANIES,

FERRIES, ETC.

Where a mate on a ship founct a man who had taken deck
passage, on some bales of moss, and, ordering him off, kicked
and otherwise assaulted him, the company was held responsible for the act: Springer Transportation Co. v. Smith 16 Lea.
(Tenn.) 498. Cf., also, Hamel v. Ferry Co., 6 N. Y. S. lO2;
Scanlon v. .Suter,158 Pa. 275 ; Coger v. Northawestern Packet
Co., 37 Iowa 145; Pendleton v. Kingsley, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 416;
Block v. Bannerman, lO La. An. I.
Where it appeared that the plaintiff was a passenger on a
steamboat, and was assaulted by a clerk whose duty it was to
collect fares or passage money, and who claimed that the
plaintiff had hidden to escape payment, and upon a denial
assaulted the plaintiff and put his eye out, the company
employing the servant was held liable: Sherley v. Billings,
8 Bush. 147. Cf., also, Bryant v. Rich, 1o6 Mass. 18o.
VARIOUS

OTHER INSTANCES.

In Mott v. Ice Company, 73 N. Y. 543, the plaintiff, while
driving, was run into and injured by a wilful act of the driver of
an ice cart belonging to the defendant. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the act which caused
the injury was wilful, and therefore beyond the employment of
the servant. This the Supreme Court reversed.
Where the servants of an inn-keeper assaulted and injured
the plaintiff, who was living at the hotel, the owner was held
liable: TVade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578. Cf., Curtis v. Dinneer,
30 N. W. 148.

Where a bartender of defendant's saloon injured the plaintiff
by forcibly and wantonly ejecting him, while intoxicated, from
the saloon, its proprietor was held liable in damages: Brazil v.
Peterson, 46 N.W. 331. Cf., Fortunev. Trainer,19 N.Y. S. 598.
For the wilful act of a servant in causing arrest of a cus-

tomer, a storekeeper has been held liable: Geraty v. Stern,
30. Hun. 426: Staple v. Schmid, 26 At. 193; Hershey v.
O'Neill, 36 Fed. 168. Cf., however, Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y.
381 ; P rterv. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 358 ; Meehan v. Moreland,
5 N. Y. S. 710.
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For an example of an assault by a servant of a theatre proprietor, for which the latter was made to respond in damages:
Cf., Fowler v. Holmes, 13 N. Y. S. 816 ; Dickson v. Waldron,
THOMAS SOVEREIGN GATES.
35 N. E. I.
Philadelbhia,February, z895.

